Another part of the problem is that lawyers’ fee agreements create incentives that do not necessarily benefit the clients’ real best interests. How often do lawyers working on contingency fee agreements for plaintiffs “underwork” their clients’ cases because a quick, even improvident, settlement increases their own earnings? How about lawyers working on hourly fee agreements for defendants, where their temptation is to overwork cases because an early settlement reduces their overall fees? I have seen law firms I characterize as “Litigation Mills” pushing cases through their offices like widgets on an assembly line. Their business success depends on client volume and turnover, not on maximizing any individual client’s recovery – more akin to the Walmart approach than the Nordstrom’s approach. If a case can be settled quickly, even for an amount that is less than what the client really deserves, the lawyer’s “productivity” improves, that is, his actual earnings per hour go up, while the client’s settlement goes down.
I have also seen other law firms who take the opposite approach and pursue a very aggressive strategy of demanding far more than the cases are actually worth and simply “rolling the dice” in hopes of a big verdict. These lawyers’ business success depends upon winning big every once in a while. They try cases that should be settled because of challenging liability problems to go for the big verdict that fattens their wallets and gives them nice publicity in the newspaper. It does not really matter to the lawyer if he loses 75% of his cases as long as he scores really big once in a while. Of course it does matter very much to the client, whose sole chance of success is the one case his lawyer decides to gamble away on a crapshoot.
